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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON, 
Plaintiff-A~pellant, 
-vs-
KIMBER LEE PEARSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
CASE NO. 17094 
This is an ac~ion by a divorced husband, respondent, 
to set aside or vacate the Decree of Divorce previously entered 
by the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup set aside the Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the order of Judge Rigtrup 
reversed and the original Judgment and Decree of Divorce rein-
stated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An Amended Verified Complaint was filed on March 7, 1979, 
by the appellant (R-15-19). The respondent thereafter came to the 
off ices of the attorney for the appellant where he was presented 
with a copy of the Amended Verified Complaint, which Complaint was 
explained to the respondent. The respondent thereupon agreed to 
the terms of the Amended Verified Complaint (Deposition of Diana 
Tulpinski p. 3-7). Respondent was presented with the Acknowledg-
ment of Service of the Amended Varif ied Complaint, Waiver and 
Consen~ to Default which he willingly signed (R-20, 47-54; D-4 the 
Deposition of Diana Tulpinski p. 3-7). The appellant obtained a 
divorce on May l, 1979, with the Decree of Divorce being signed by 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 11, 1979 (R-20-30). 
The respondent obtained a copy of the Findings o=·Fac~ and 
Decree of Divorce on July 26, 1979 (R-36). 
The appellant got an Order to Show Cause against the 
respondent to have the respondent comply with the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce (R-32, 37-38), which Orde~ to Show Cause was pre-
sented to the Court on October 30, 1979, and served uoon the resoon-
~ -
dent on November 8, 1979. At the hearing in front of the Honorable 
Christine Durham on November 29, 1979, respondent, through his atto~-
ney, presented the appellant with his Motion to Set Aside the J~dg­
rnent, along with the accompanying Affidavit (R-34-36, 39-42). 
- 2 -
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Respondent was seeking to have the Decree of Divorce set aside 
under Rule 60(b) and in particular Rule 60(b) (3), based upon a~ 
alleged fraud and ~isrepresentation (R-35-36 and 39). 
Respondent's Motion was heard on April 4, 1980 by Judge 
Rigtrup who set aside the Decree of Divorce (R-46, 54-57). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SETTING ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms a.s are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the .summons in a~ 
action has not been personally served upon the de-
fendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defenda~t 
has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is 
void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upo~ 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons ( 1) , ( 2) , ( 3) , or ( 4) 
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A Motion under this 
- 3 -
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subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judg-
ment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the oower of a court to entertain an independent action 
~ -
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action." 
The Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce in the above 
entitled action had been brought under Rule 60(b) (1) a~d (3) where 
the respondent represented there had neen a mistake, inadvertence, 
su~prise or excusable neglect and/or fraud or misrepresentation in 
this action (R-35). The argument as to the fraud charge was reputed 
by the Affidavit of the appellant (R-50), her attorney (R-47), the 
Affidavit of Susan McCarthy (R-52), and the deposition of Diana 
Tulpinski~ ~11 of whom specifically stated that the respondent had 
come to the offices of the appellant's attorney, he was ?resented 
with the copy of the Amended Verified Complaint, and he had willingly, 
freely and voluntarily signed the Waiver and Acknowledgment of 
Service and Consent to Default (R-20) . The respondent states in 
his Affidavit that he had obtained a copy of the Decree of Divorce 
on approximately July 26, 1979, which was one and on-half months 
after the Decree of Divorce had been entered (R-36, 28). (It should 
be noted that the attorney for the appellant represented to the 
Court that the respondent had set approximately three appointments 
with said attorney to pick up copies of the Decree of Divorce, but 
that he had failed to keep said appointments, and further had refused 
- 4 -
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to give the attorney for the appellant an address where copies 
could be sent to said respondent.) Even though a copy had 
been obtained by the respondent on J~ly 25, 1979, the respon-
dent failed to act or take any action until November 20, 1979, 
a period of almost four full months after the date that the 
respondent had obtained a copy of the Decree of Divorce. 
This was clearly beyond the time period allowed under Rule 
60(b) which requires that a party seek its relief within 
three (3) months after the Judgment or Order has been entered. 
In McGavin ·v. McGavin, 27 U2d 200, 494 P2d 233 (1972), an 
action involving a claim by a former husband that his former 
wife had perpetrated a fraud on the divorce court claiming 
that the former husband was the father of a child that was un-
born at the time of the divorce, this court held that after 
the period of time of 14~ months had elapsed since the Decree 
of Divorce had been entered that the former husband had to 
pursue his oossible remedies in a separate action and could 
not attempt to set aside the Decree of Divorce in that action. 
This court required that there must be compliance with the 
3-rnonth procedure set forth in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Since there was no compliance with this 
. 
rule, this court rejected the claim of the former husband. 
In the case before this court, the respondent had failed to 
- 5 -
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' 
act within the prescribed time period, and if he is to attack the 
Decree, he must do so in a separate action and not in this parti-
cular case. 
The respondent attempted to have the J~dgment set aside 
under Rule 60(b) and in particular Rule 60(b) (1) and (3). The 
court denied allowing the judgment to be set aside under either of 
those two rules. The court thereafter, however, set the Judgment 
aside under Rule 60(b) (7) on its own motion and without ever having 
been requested ny respondent or his counsel. Such a setting aside 
was totally an abuse of discretion by the court and without merit. 
In Kessirnakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P2d 888 (1976), this 
court held in a case where the defendant had made a Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment in a divorce action 5-2/3's mo~tha after the 
J~dgment had been entered, that the trial court had no jurisdiction 
to set aside the Judgment. In Kessirnakis, the defenda~t attempted 
to have the court relieve him of a financial burden which had been 
placed upon him as being an inequity against him. This court held 
that that was not a reason for setting aside the Judgment. The 
trial court in this matter was without jurisdictio~ to set aside 
the property agreement; six months had elapsed, leaving the trial 
court without jurisdiction. In setting aside the JJdgment, the 
trial court in the instant case has abused its discretion and said 
Judgment should be re-instated and affirmed by this court. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACTING WAIVER OF RIGHTS SHOULD BE 
GIVEN SANCTION BY THE COURT 
It is clearly established by the Affidavit of the appella~t 
- 6 -
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(R-50), the Affidavit of the attorney for the appella~t 
(R-47), the deposition o~ Diana Tulpinski, and the Affidavit 
~ 
of Susan McCarthy (R-52), that the respondent had voluntarily 
and freely, of his own will and volition, agreed to the terms 
that were set forth in the Amended Verified Complaint, and 
that such Amended V2rif ied Complaint was the only Amended 
Complaint which was prepared in this matter, the only one 
presented to the respondent, the only one filed with the 
Clerk of the Court, and the only one upon which the respon-
dent made his agreement, and further, the one upon which the 
respondent thereafter signed the Waiver of Service, Acknow-
ledgment and Consent to Default (R-20) . The respondent took 
no action of any type contesting the Amended V2rif ied Complain~ 
or the Decree of Divorce until the date upon which the Order 
to Show Cause hearing filed by the appellant was held to 
require ~he respondent to comply with the terms and conditions 
of the Decree of Divorce. It is reasonable to believe that 
no action would ever have been taken by the respondent had 
not the appellant taken action to have the Decree of Divorce 
complied with by the respondent. 
The Amended Verified Complaint contains the exact pro-
visions as the Decree of Divorce, with the exception of a 
minor modification as to specifically naming utility bills. 
The respondent had in this matter contracted away his rights 
and privileges, and as such he should not be given the oppor-
- 7 -
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tunity to have the property settlement that had been agreed to by 
him set aside. In Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (1980), this court 
held, in an attem?t by the husband to ~ave the Decree of Divorce 
modified, which modification was denied, 
11 
•• when a Decree is based on a ?roperty settlement 
agreement, forged by the parties and 3anctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into consideration. 
Equity is not available to ~e-instate the rights a~d 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because 
one has come to regret the bargain it made. Accordingly, 
the law limits the contin~ing jurisdiction of the court 
where a property settlement agreement has been incorpor-
ated into the Decree ... 11 p.1250 
In this particular case there was no com?elling reason for the 
setting aside of the Decree of Divorce. The respondent had appa-
rently come to regret his decision, and was attem?ting through 
means, 11 whether by hook or by crook", to have the Decree set 
aside, which the trial court allowed. There was no inequity shown 
or proven by the respo~dent, or as previously stated, any compel-
ling reason why the Decree of Divorce should be set aside. Rule 
60(b) limits the bringing of actions to three months fo~ setting 
aside of Judgments and Decrees. The reason for such rule is that 
there must be some period of time upon which Judgments and Decrees 
can no longer by challenged so as to give vested property rights 
in individuals. To allow such agreements as have been made in this 
particular case to be set aside upon any whim would ~ean that at 
no time would any party be secure in the rights and privileges 
- 8 -
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which they have been awarded by a Decree. It could very easily 
be seen as preventing the transferring of any real or personal 
property rights at any time. Courts need to give sanctity to a 
Decree in order to give credence and credibility to the rulings 
and decisions by the court for the protection of the society and 
the contracting of rights by individual parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was without jurisdiction to set aside 
the Decree of Divorce in this action. The respondent had failed 
to meet any of the requirements or provisions of Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This action should be re-
manded to the trial court with directions that the original Decree 
of Divorce be re-instated for failure to comply with Rule 60 (b) 
- 9 -
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